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ABSTRACT 
Perhaps no other patient safety intervention depends so acutely on effective interprofessional 
teamwork for patient survival than the hospital rapid response system (RRS). Yet little is 
known about nurse-physician relationships when rescuing at-risk patients. This study 
compared nursing and medical staff perceptions of a mature RRS at a large tertiary hospital. 
Findings indicate the RRS may be failing to address a hierarchical culture and systems-level 
barriers to early recognition and response to patient deterioration.  
 
Keywords: nursing, medical emergency response team, patient deterioration, rapid response 
system, staff perceptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rapid response systems (RRSs) have changed how staff working in acute hospital 
wards recognize and respond to patients at risk of clinical deterioration. RRSs typically 
include standardized medical emergency response team (MERT) criteria and escalation 
protocols based on vital sign monitoring. When MERT call criteria are triggered by staff at 
the bedside, a rapid response team with critical care expertise arrives to assess and stabilize 
the deteriorating ward patient and often arranges for transfer to the intensive care unit (ICU). 
RRSs are designed primarily to improve the timely recognition of at risk patients and to 
overcome delays in initiating definitive treatment that occur within the traditional hierarchical 
“chain of command” medical model.1 The intent is to target systems-level barriers known to 
cause serious patient harm such as inadequate clinical monitoring, staff failure to appreciate 
clinical urgency or fears about escalating concerns, poor communication and teamwork 
during patient crises, and suboptimal management of acutely ill patients by general ward 
staff.
2
     
At face value, RRSs offer significant advantages compared to traditional models of 
care and a potential organizational solution to growing concerns about failure-to-rescue. 
Governments and hospital leaders have popularized the concept and dedicated significant 
resources to implement policy and practice guidelines.
3
 Yet, despite decades of research on 
RRSs, systematic review findings are mixed and improvements in patient survival have fallen 
short of expectations.
4,5
 The largest prospective cluster-randomised controlled trial, the 
Australian MERIT study, found the introduction of a RRS did not reduce the incidence of 
cardiac arrest, unplanned ICU admission or unexpected death.
6
 Thus the benefits of RRSs 
continue to be debated. Proponents reject inconclusive research findings on methodological 
grounds and point to the need for more research.
7
 Others argue that RRSs are a “band-aid” 
Manuscript
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for a failed model of ward care,
8
 and a small nascent literature has begun to critically analyze 
the underlying assumptions of RRSs for patient safety.
9
          
 What is also becoming clearer as RRSs mature is that staff often do not engage with 
the intervention as it was intended.
10
 This is because a RRS is not a clean, discrete 
intervention—but a complex cultural system of change that is superimposed on existing local 
hospital systems and professional norms.
11
 Furthermore, while the majority of research has 
investigated modified MERT criteria or team composition, ward staff perceptions and 
processes have been largely ignored.
12
 RRSs challenge traditional professional boundaries 
and thus a barrier may be the differing perceptions of nursing and medical staff of the RRS. 
Surprisingly few researchers have analyzed both nursing and medical perspectives in the 
same study. Yet to create the kind of teamwork that patient safety depends on will require 
systematic investigation of these obstacles to managing patient deterioration. The purpose of 
this study was therefore to explore and compare nursing and medical staff perceptions of 
MERT use at a large tertiary hospital with a mature RRS.  
BACKGROUND 
Prompted by a consistent finding that ward staff frequently do not activate the RRS 
despite MERT call criteria being met, there is a growing nursing literature exploring factors 
that influence how acute care staff use RRSs. Jones and colleagues’13 review of 15 studies of 
barriers and facilitators to nurses’ effective use of RRSs identified five major factors: 
adequate education about the role and components of the RRS, clinical expertise and previous 
experience in emergency situations, support by MERT and ward nursing and medical staff, 
nurses’ familiarity with and advocacy for the patient, and nurses’ workload. A further 
systematic review found that ward staff were more likely to use early warning score systems 
to confirm their intuitive judgment of patient deterioration, as opposed to routinely using the 
MERT criteria during patient assessment to proactively identify problems.
14
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Since these reviews, several qualitative studies have explored ward nurses’ decision-
making around MERT activation and perceptions of the impact of RRSs. Overall, findings 
suggest that nurses view the outcomes of a RRS positively: it legitimizes their concerns and 
is a way of working around ward and systems barriers to escalate care.
15-17
 Yet the decision to 
call for help is a complex judgment. Even when nurses are aware that patients meet MERT 
criteria they may not call for assistance because they tend to rely on intuitive reasoning and 
question the validity of the criteria based on their clinical judgment.
10,17,18
 It was found, for 
example, that nurses frequently sought advice from others, gathered additional assessment or 
investigation data, or attempted new interventions before determining whether a MERT call 
was necessary.
19
 Indeed, a recent Australian study found that instead of being used as an 
early intervention strategy, registered nurses (RNs) spoke about managing deteriorating 
patients in ways that conflated MERT and cardiac arrest calls, with a MERT being perceived 
as a last resort.
18
 Fears of being reprimanded or appearing incompetent to others were also 
powerful reasons for delaying activation.
18
  
A few large cross-sectional surveys of staff perceptions of RRSs are also available 
which support the above findings. Four years after the introduction of a RRS in an Australian 
hospital, a survey of 351 nurses found that the MERT was valued by staff and often 
perceived to be a “back-up” for managing sick patients.20 Despite this, almost three-quarters 
of the sample indicated they would call covering medical staff before activating the RRS. 
Many nurses also commented that despite the criteria, the decision to call would depend on 
how sick they perceived the patient to be. Bagshaw et al.
21
 replicated these findings among 
275 medical-surgical nurses working in a Canadian tertiary hospital, with 75.9% indicating 
they would call the responsible physician before activating the RRS.  
Only two previous studies were identified that compared nursing and medical staff 
perceptions of a RRS. Sarani et al.
22
 found that RNs and medical residents working on 
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general medical-surgical wards agreed that a RRS improved patient safety, but RNs held this 
belief more strongly than their medical colleagues. Where RNs disagreed that the RRS 
decreased their clinical skills and learning opportunities, medical residents were neutral about 
the impact. Azzopardi et al.
23
 also found that pediatric nurses were much more likely to call a 
covering physician first, be actively discouraged to activate the RRS by a physician, fear 
criticism, and experience negative attitudes by the rapid response team compared to medical 
staff. Approximately half of the medical respondents and a third of nurses reported they 
would not activate a MERT if the patient met the criteria but did not look unwell.
23
 Taken 
together, these findings indicate the need for larger comparative studies of nursing and 
medical perceptions of RRSs.  
METHODS 
Study design 
A single site, cross-sectional survey design was used as part of a larger program of 
research exploring patient assessment in the acute care setting.
24,25 
Setting 
The study was conducted at a 929-bed tertiary referral teaching hospital in Southeast 
Queensland, Australia. The hospital provides most major health specialties including 
medicine, surgery, mental health, oncology, maternity and trauma services and more than 30 
subspecialties. It is typical of large tertiary hospitals across Australia in terms of size, average 
length of stay, cost-per case mix adjusted separations, emergency room waiting times, and 
hospital separations with an adverse event.
26 
Hospital rapid response system 
During the study period the hospital RRS followed the process outlined in the 
Supplemental Digital Content, Figure. A standardized observation and response chart was 
used by nursing staff to document vital signs and specify actions in response to deterioration. 
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The hospital uses a single parameter system with two graded response categories color-coded 
yellow and orange. Unless individual modifications to MERT criteria had been documented 
by a physician, any clinical parameter tracking in the yellow criteria triggered a clinical 
review, whereas any clinical parameter in the orange criteria triggered a MERT call (see 
Supplemental Digital Content, Table 1). This RRS operates alongside a traditional “code 
blue” cardiac arrest team for patients in cardiopulmonary arrest or with an imminently life 
threatening condition.   
Sample 
We conducted a hospital-wide survey of the population of RNs/midwives and medical 
staff involved in the clinical care of patients on acute care wards. From a total of 106 units in 
the hospital, the eligible sampling frame was 40 acute care areas. Eligible participants 
included nursing and medical staff working in medicine, surgery, oncology, mental health 
and maternity service areas. We excluded critical care areas, operating rooms or ambulatory 
service delivery because our focus was acute ward environments where staff-patient ratios, 
level of support and expertise may differ.  
Data collection 
Recruitment and data collection occurred between June and July 2013. Study 
procedures have been described in detail elsewhere.
24,25
 Briefly, eligible staff identified from 
work rosters received anonymous paper-based surveys containing participant information and 
return self-addressed envelopes through the hospital internal mail system. Alternatively, 
participants could complete an online version of the survey advertised by screensavers and 
posters in clinical areas using work computers or electronic tablets provided by research 
assistants. All study procedures were approved by both the Hospital and University Human 
Research Ethics Committees.   
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Staff perceptions of the RRS were evaluated using the Rapid Response System Staff 
Knowledge and Satisfaction Survey developed by the Australian Commission on Safety and 
Quality in Health Care,
27
 based on a previously validated questionnaire.
20
 The instrument 
included 24 items designed to evaluate (1) factors that are known to inhibit effective 
activation and use of RRSs (10 items), (2) perceived effectiveness of the RRS in responding 
to and managing clinical deterioration (10 items), and (3) perceived effectiveness of 
teamwork and communication during RRS calls (4 items). All items were measured using a 
response scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Additional items elicited staff discipline and specialty area, years of clinical 
experience, whether they had received education related to the hospital’s RRS in the previous 
12 months, and knowledge of the MERT activation criteria. An open-ended question for 
participants to provide additional free text comments on the RRS was posed at the end of the 
survey.  
Data analysis 
Data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 21 (IBM Corporation, 
Armonk, NY, USA). We did not replace missing values as there was less than 2% missing 
data for all scale items, although specialty area was not specified by 63 (33%) medical staff. 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize sample characteristics and to examine 
frequency distributions for each item. Fisher’s exact tests were used to compare nursing and 
medical staff perceptions for each item after collapsing response categories into “strongly 
disagree/disagree/uncertain” and “agree/strongly agree.” Finally, we compared nursing and 
medical subscale scores using ANCOVA, adjusting for years of clinical experience. 
Statistical significance was set at p < .05. A constructivist methodology guided the analysis 
of the open-ended text.
28
 Through open and focused coding the analysis generated theoretical 
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concepts which were subsequently grounded in current social conventions and power 
relations. 
RESULTS 
Sample characteristics 
A total of 624 staff completed the survey including 434 RNs and 190 medical staff, 
giving an overall response rate of 29.8%. Supplemental Digital Content, Table 2 shows that 
RNs had greater clinical experience compared to medical staff (χ² = 60.86, p < .001), with 
48.4% of RNs having more than 10 years’ experience. Approximately one-third (35.2%) of 
medical staff had 3 years or less clinical experience. Staff from a range of specialty areas 
responded to the survey, although it was difficult to make comparisons because of missing 
data for medical staff. Among RNs, over half of the respondents worked in acute surgical 
(32.7%) or medical (27.6%) wards. The majority of both groups reported having a good 
understanding of MERT call criteria, with 67.7% of RNs and 60.5% of medical staff having 
completed education on the RRS within the last 12 months. 
 A summary of RN and medical survey responses are presented in Supplemental 
Digital Content, Table 3. Overall, the pattern of survey findings highlighted subtle but 
important differences between groups.  
Perceived benefits and usefulness of MERT 
 Most staff (97%) agreed or strongly agreed that the patients they care for have 
complex medical problems, that patients receive effective emergency assistance from the 
MERT (94.5%), and that the MERT respond to calls in an appropriate timeframe (90.2%). 
Both groups believed (agreed or strongly agreed) that MERT activation allowed them to seek 
help for patients when worried (92.9%), although RNs more strongly agreed with this 
statement compared to medical staff (p < .01, Fisher’s exact test). Similarly, most staff (82%) 
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disagreed or strongly disagreed that the MERT is not helpful in managing sick patients on the 
ward. 
Impact on clinical skills and managing acutely ill patients  
 More than one-third (37.6%) of RNs agreed that a MERT call increased their 
workload when caring for a sick patient, compared to 12.6% of medical staff (p < .01). Over 
half (62.6%) of both RNs and medical staff agreed that MERT calls taught them how to 
better manage acutely ill ward patients, although about 20% remained uncertain. Also, while 
most staff (86.8%) disagreed that MERT calls reduced their skills in managing sick patients, 
RNs tended to hold this belief more strongly compared to medical staff (p = .04). 
Perceived reasons for MERT calls 
  When asked why MERT calls were needed, a significant minority of RNs (14.2%) 
believed they were due to inadequate medical management, compared to 3.2% of medical 
staff who held this view (p < .01). Only approximately 5% of RNs and medical respondents 
suggested MERT calls were due to inadequate nursing management of ward patients.  
Beliefs about MERT activation 
Interestingly, 70.3% of RNs and 70.1% of medical staff indicated they would contact 
the patient’s treating physician before activating the MERT (item 6). Approximately 17% of 
both groups remained uncertain about triggering a MERT call without contacting medical 
staff first. Moreover, 21.8% of medical staff and 14.7% of RNs would not activate the MERT 
if they could not contact the treating physician first (item 7). This allegiance to the traditional 
hierarchical model was more prevalent among medical staff (p < .01), although 25% of 
medical respondents were uncertain about activating the MERT without contacting the 
treating physician first. 
Over half of RNs (55.7%) and medical staff (55.8%) were uncertain or disagreed that 
they would activate the MERT for a patient using the “worried” criteria if their vital signs 
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were normal. Moreover, 34.2% of medical respondents and 20% of RNs agreed they would 
not trigger a MERT if a patient met the activation criteria but did not look unwell (p < .01). 
Perceived barriers to MERT activation 
 A significant minority of RNs (17.1%) and a smaller proportion of medical staff 
(7.9%) were reluctant to activate the MERT because they feared criticism if their patient was 
not found to be critically unwell (p < .01). Yet, most staff (92.9%) reported they felt 
confident triggering a MERT call. Medical staff perceived greater support from both junior (p 
< .01) and senior (p < .01) physicians to activate a MERT compared to RNs, whereas 14.5% 
and 18.1% of RNs disagreed support was available from junior or senior medical staff 
respectively. Conversely, RNs perceived greater support from both ward nurses (p < .01) and 
senior nurses (p < .01) to activate a MERT compared to medical staff. 
Teamwork and communication during a MERT call 
 Most RNs (89%) and medical staff (78.4%) indicated they understood their role 
during MERT calls; however, nurses more often strongly agreed (p < .01). Likewise, RNs 
were more likely to endorse effective communication during a MERT (p = .04). 
Approximately three-quarters of both RNs (72.7%) and medical staff (75.5%) believed the 
MERT encouraged effective teamwork. In addition, 67.5% of RNs and 63.7% of medical 
staff agreed the ongoing plan for the patient was clearly documented after a MERT call. 
Comparison of nursing and medical survey mean scores  
 Beyond item level analysis of survey data, we compared nursing and medical staff 
mean scores on each subscale after adjusting for years of clinical experience. Overall, while 
both groups rated the MERT positively, RNs perceived the MERT as more effective in 
managing clinical deterioration (adjusted means = 3.65 vs. 3.58, F [1, 601] = 4.39, p = .04) 
and perceived greater MERT teamwork and communication (adjusted means = 3.83 vs. 3.71, 
F [1, 617] = 5.80, p = .02) compared to their medical colleagues. Both groups similarly rated 
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perceived barriers to MERT activation as relatively low overall (adjusted means = 2.54 vs. 
2.52, F [1, 595] = 0.18, p = .67). 
Qualitative findings 
Of the 624 completed surveys, 129 included open-ended text contributions: 87 from 
RNs and 42 from medical staff. Our analysis produced an account of the qualitative data that 
gave focus to the differing positioning of nurses and physicians around the rapid response 
process. What was shared by nurses and medical staff was a perception of the RRS as an 
excellent service and an effective measure in addressing acute patient deterioration. Both 
groups perceived the system as vital backup. Yet these views were significantly moderated by 
context.  
The theory behind the MERT team is excellent but depending on the situation/team it 
can be very ineffective. (RN) 
Effectiveness of the MERT system depends entirely on the people within the team on that 
particular day. (Medical) 
            It may be that an important factor in the effectiveness of the MERT is the constitution of the 
team. Nonetheless, a further contextual factor was the degree of authority that each 
professional group brought to the situation.  
Whose call? 
The system was dependent upon the clinical judgment of physicians. Nurses, in turn, 
perceived that they were often criticized for invoking a MERT call based on criteria set down 
by medical staff. As the following RNs noted:  
Despite the patient being within MERT criteria the medical and MERT teams often ask 
nursing staff why a MERT was called. Nurses are often criticized at the bedside. (RN) 
Sometimes senior doctors scoff at my comment that the patient is in MERT criteria and 
a MERT should be called. (RN)  
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            Thus for medical staff the inference was that nurses were activating the MERT too frequently 
and unnecessarily.  
Too many MERT calls are made…takes up too much clinical time and the “boy who 
cried wolf” mentality can make people overly casual about them. (Medical) 
There needs to be a system in place to prevent MERT calls. (Medical) 
Implied here is an expectation that decisions should be made by RNs even where those 
decisions circumvent or deviate from the protocol. This appeared, on the one hand, as 
criticism of the nursing management of the MERT system while on the other hand, as 
endorsement of greater flexibility of decision-making by RNs. For medical staff, 
however, this did not mean relinquishing responsibility for patient assessment to nurses.   
The I and the They  
Medical control over decision-making allowed physicians greater autonomy in 
managing the system. The language in the following excerpts reflects a confidence and 
authority. 
By and large I never activate the MERT. I tend to sort out the problems myself. 
(Medical) 
When one of my patients is sick I assess the patient myself and manage appropriately.  
If deteriorating I will then call MERT or ICU if appropriate. (Medical) 
By contrast, nurses were dependent upon the actions or inaction of medical staff and the 
associated lack of control appeared to generate uncertainty.  
Creating uncertainty 
While the MERT protocol directed nurses to act on physiological parameters it was 
often the case that those parameters were not updated. Importantly, this did not engender a 
situation where RNs felt able to apply and act on their assessment skills.   
Doctors need to alter MERT criteria more often to avoid unnecessary calls. (RN) 
The doctors need to change the parameters which they rarely do. (RN) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
12 
 
 
 
Treating teams are often reluctant to change MERT criteria and yet do not come up 
with a clear plan for a patient. (RN) 
The language above suggests a deference to medical staff and to MERT protocol. It appeared, 
therefore, that practices and interprofessional relationships around the MERT implicitly or 
explicitly marginalized the nurse in the process of assessment of a deteriorating patient. As 
the following RNs commented: 
I worry that nursing assessment skills are decreasing with the attitude around MERT 
criteria. (RN) 
MERT often prevents nursing staff from using their clinical skills to deal with sick 
patients. (RN) 
This analysis not only raises questions about the effectiveness or otherwise of the RRS, but 
contests the assumption that such systems are untouched by institutional structures such as 
professional hierarchies and practice norms. Interprofessional relationships do affect the 
implementation of policy where processes of change are inexorably tied to issues of control 
and power.  
DISCUSSION 
The RRS challenges the cultural norms around how RNs and medical staff interact 
during hospital care—what Gordon29 has described as “intimate strangers” engaged in 
“parallel play” at the patient’s bedside. Yet so little of the RRS literature has sought both 
nursing and medical staff perceptions, or even acknowledged the importance of nurse-
physician relationships when rescuing at-risk patients. In line with previous research,
10
 our 
findings suggest increased understanding of staff perceptions may help explain the mixed 
effectiveness of RRSs on patient outcomes.  
There are some interesting contradictions in the data worth exploring. While on the 
one hand, most staff (>90%) believed the RRS was effective, that it enabled them to seek 
help when worried and that they felt confident calling a MERT—on the other hand, the 
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majority of staff also held beliefs that would delay activation. Over 70% of staff would 
contact the patient’s treating physician before activating the MERT and there was significant 
uncertainty about activating the MERT without first contacting the treating physician. Over 
half (>55%) of the sample were unlikely to activate the RRS for a patient using the “worried” 
criteria if their vital signs were normal, and a significant subset would not trigger a MERT if 
a patient met the activation criteria but did not look unwell. These findings support previous 
research
20,21,23 
and indicate that although clinicians positively endorse RRSs as a patient 
safety intervention, even in a mature RRS, significant tensions exist around how these 
systems are enacted in practice.   
Evidence of tension was reflected in notable differences between nursing and medical 
perceptions of the RRS. Medical staff were less positive about the effectiveness of the RRS in 
managing clinical deterioration and promoting teamwork and communication compared to 
RNs. They were also less certain that the RRS did not reduce their clinical skills. Findings 
indicated medical staff were more likely to call the treating physician first, or elect not to call 
a MERT based on their assessment even if criteria were met. These results are consistent with 
Sarani et al.
22
 who argue that by virtue of their direct continuous care of a limited number of 
patients, RNs are better able to identify and appreciate the gaps in care and in time between 
recognition of patient deterioration and intervention. RNs are also more likely to have their 
safety concerns underappreciated by medical staff, which may help explain the greater 
perceived benefits of the RRS among nurses compared to medical staff.
22
         
As noted above, perceived support for the decision to activate the RRS also differed 
by profession. Both groups were more likely to feel supported to use the RRS by members of 
their own profession. Like previous studies,
13,23
 RNs were also more reluctant to activate the 
RRS because of fear of criticism. On this point and while the survey data are not sufficient ly 
sensitive to draw conclusions about the influence of the prevailing culture on 
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interprofessional teamwork, they do indicate that the RRS may be failing to address the 
obstacles of a hierarchical clinical structure; medical staff were more confident in their 
clinical and organisational authority in patient management within the process.  
Qualitative data analysis generated a deeper understanding. As professional 
judgement is overridden by the organisational authority invested in the RRS, staff may feel 
caught between policy that mandates MERT activation and local practices. Where nurses are 
empowered in their authority to escalate on the basis of the MERT criteria, the very tool itself 
can be seen as representing a deskilling of nursing judgment. Standardizing risk assessment 
satisfies bureaucratic accountability, but leaves nurses with little capacity to make more 
sophisticated individualized clinical judgments. Once embedded in everyday practice, MERT 
criteria can also marginalize other assessment cues that reflect early changes in patient 
status.
25,30
 As the MERT criteria reflect end-points of clinical deterioration the RRS is 
essentially more reactive than preventative,
19,25
 which creates uncertainty when staff are 
worried about a patient with subtle changes or wish to act on early trends in patient data. 
Moreover, since the power to individualize the criteria belongs only to the physician, nurses 
find themselves negotiating with medical staff to alter the criteria when clinically indicated. 
Interestingly, differences between nursing and medical staff perceptions of the RRS 
were more prominent in the open-ended data. We see this in the way medical staff position 
themselves as working alone and making independent clinical decisions based on patient 
assessment. RNs, by contrast, are positioned as dependent on medicine for decision-making 
around patient deterioration. The narrative is inherently anti-team. Thus it appears that the 
hierarchical power structures the RRS is designed to circumvent are also reproduced as it is 
enacted in practice. Only medical staff have professional discretion or the power to define 
what is ‘normal’ for the patient; the RN’s role remains that of supporting medical practice. In 
line with previous research,
10
 we question the effectiveness of color-coded structured 
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decision-making tools for patient safety, particularly when these systemic factors are not 
taken into account. 
Limitations 
  As a self-report survey at a single hospital, our findings need to be interpreted with 
possible limitations in mind. Although typical of hospital staff surveys, the limited response 
rate raises the possibility of sampling bias. For example, while staff were sampled from each 
acute care area in the hospital, participants may have differed to the target population based 
on their usage or experience of the RRS. In addition, although our choice of measure was 
based on previous studies, there is scope for further instrument development and testing to 
strengthen the scale.  
CONCLUSION 
 This study provides insight into how a mature RRS is perceived and operationalized 
by nursing and medical staff in acute hospital wards. Five years after the implementation of a 
RRS, staff perceptions revealed major obstacles to MERT activation and significant 
professional tensions around how the RRS is enacted in practice. Based on these findings we 
argue the easy solution of more education and auditing for staff compliance with the RRS is 
not the answer. While RRSs may appear to be a “quick fix” to the problem of failure-to-
rescue,
9 
the findings from this study and previous research indicate there is a danger that they 
obscure the root causes of preventable deaths.
 
Serious action is required by health care 
facilities to address the cultural and system level problems identified by this research to 
develop an effective safety culture and achieve improved patient outcomes.  
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